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Icelandic fisheries have gone through tremendous changes since the 1980s
and the gradual implementation of individual transferable quotas. The paper
investigates to what extent the power of different stakeholders in the fisheries
management system has changed, and examines whether and in which fields
enhanced participation is favoured by relevant stakeholder groups. Strengths and
weaknesses of participation within the system are scrutinized and alternatives assessed.
The analytical framework stems from the concept of adaptive co-management,
whereas the empirical data derives from a survey on Icelandic fisheries management
among important stakeholder groups. This survey showed that the critique of
individual transferable quotas is not homogeneous. Regional differences are present
regarding the evaluation of the current regime, but also of proposed alternative
management instruments. Overall, more stakeholder participation, especially in data
gathering and decision making, is demanded. This has in fact decreased over time. The
authors suggest that the perceived shortcomings of the quota system in general and
the lack of stakeholder participation in particular, can be addressed by adopting certain
elements of adaptive co-management.
Keywords: Fisheries management; Adaptive co-management; ITQs; Stakeholder
participation; IcelandIntroduction
Fisheries throughout the world are in a serious decline. Transition to a more sustainable
situation needs a comprehensive approach that manages to include the partly conflicting
disciplines of ecology, economics and social sciences. This is due to threats facing both
the biomass and also the livelihood of coastal and fisheries dependent communities. It is
therefore necessary to rethink fisheries management and policy instruments.
Fisheries management is a challenging task. Uncertainty and complexity, coupled
with the opposite interests of various stakeholder groups, transform it into a veritable
Gordian knot. In most cases, fisheries management is the task of nation states or
supranational institutions, including, for example, the European Union and its Com-
mon Fisheries Policy. The generally rigid top-down approaches of these institutions
show several shortcomings, mainly but not exclusively regarding social aspects (Berkes
2009; Grafton 2005; Jentoft 2007; Olson 2011). An assessment of alternatives is there-
fore advisable. Statements affirming that essential changes cannot take place without
enhanced stakeholder consultation have become more prominent over the past2015 Kokorsch et al. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
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entists can be illustrated with examples from various fisheries management regimes
throughout the world. Changes, however, require not only political will, but, following
the maxim of co-management, also stakeholders’ commitment (Berkes 2007, 2010).
Thus the impetus for enhanced stakeholder involvement in bottom-up strategies has to
come from the the stakeholders themselves. Increased stakeholder involvement in nu-
merous fields of fisheries management, such as data gathering, knowledge utilisation,
and stock assessment, is advocated by academia (Jentoft and Mikalsen 2014; Rettig
et al. 1989; Soliman 2014a; St Martin et al. 2007) as well as stakeholders themselves
(Folke et al. 2005).
Iceland has been looked upon as a laboratory for fisheries management. Particularly in
the field of quota-based management, Iceland was a pioneer, introducing a system of
vessel-based quotas in 1984 and later adding transferability. Until 1984, a mixture of
methods was used, including the quota management of certain species (e.g. herring) and
effort restrictions in the demersal fisheries (Matthiasson and Agnarsson 2009; Pálsson and
Helgason 1995). However, problems of overcapacity became more and more apparent.
Following some years of steadily decreasing catches that did not even reach the recom-
mended Total Allowable Catch (TAC) by the Marine Research Institute (Matthiasson
2003), individual vessel quotas were implemented in the demersal fisheries. Based on the
catch history for the previous 3 years, each vessel was allocated a share of the annually set
TAC. In this transitional phase, fishermen had the choice between the quota system and
the former system based on restricting effort (Eythórsson 2000).
The switch to the current individual transferable quota (ITQ) system took place in
1990. Transferability of quotas turned a former common pool resource de facto into a
collection of important tradable assets (Benediktsson 2014; Benediktsson and Karlsdót-
tir 2011). This was thus a market-based solution that was meant to contribute to a de-
crease in fleet size and hence both the conservation of fish stocks and improved
economics of the fishing sector. Just to what extent these goals have been achieved is
fiercely debated, as was the case with the earlier management regimes also. The ITQ
system, however, did not grapple at all with the question of social equity (Carothers
and Chambers 2012; Holm et al. 2015; Soliman 2014b).
Nonetheless, the latest amendments of the Fisheries Management Act show that
questions concerning regional development have been taken seriously to some extent.
Two instruments have been introduced to support the small-scale sector and/or assist
regions that were negatively affected by the introduction of ITQs. Community quotas
(Icel. byggðakvótar) were introduced in 2002/03. The main purpose was to mitigate the
impacts of quota transfers from small and vulnerable communities. Coastal fisheries
(Icel. strandveiðar) were added in 2009. This scheme aims to enable small-scale opera-
tors access to the fisheries without having to buy quotas. Also, catch fees (Icel. veiðig-
jöld) have been gradually taken up, in response to concerns about the lack of resource
rent payments from the industry to society at large (see: (Matthiasson 2008; Matthias-
son and Agnarsson 2009).
The Icelandic system has been promoted worldwide as an example of an economic-
ally efficient and ecologically sustainable fisheries management system (Árnason 2012;
Christensen et al. 2009a; Leal 2005). Yet, despite the fact that Icelandic fisheries have
been analysed rather thoroughly, participatory aspects have not been prominent in the
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management systems have placed considerable emphasis on implementing bottom-up
and participatory methods (Aranda and Christensen 2009; Evans et al. 2011; Trimble
and Berkes 2013), such mechanisms are still absent in Iceland. Various instruments of
fisheries management have been utilised during the past 40–50 years. However, those
who have had to apply these instruments and adjust their work routines were barely in-
volved in the decision and policy making process during the implementation of the
most significant reforms. In fact, stakeholder involvement seems to have decreased over
time (Christensen et al. 2009b; Eythórsson 2000).
An important question that arises is how far enhanced participation is favoured by
the most affected stakeholder groups in Iceland – those whose livelihood depends dir-
ectly on the fisheries. This is the basic question of this paper. Having gained popularity
in literature and practice during the past few decades, the concept of adaptive co-
management (ACM) provides the theoretical framework. After the introduction, a gen-
eral discussion of adaptive co-management in resource management is presented,
followed by an analysis of the power structure in the Icelandic fisheries policy making.
This is a necessary and preparatory step for a thorough discussion of the stakeholders’
statements. The paper concludes with some reflections about the possibilities for intro-
ducing adaptive co-management to Icelandic fisheries.
Based on empirical data from a comprehensive survey conducted within a European
research project on ‘results-based management’ (EcoFishMan), the article examines
relevant questions about stakeholder involvement, knowledge utilisation and the overall
assessment of the recent management regime. Data from the survey will be analysed in
the light of regional and occupational differences. The analysis and discussion is
intended to contribute to an ongoing national and international debate about appropri-
ate fisheries management systems.
Adaptive co-management and fisheries
One possible avenue for the rethinking of fisheries management is enhanced stake-
holder participation (Berkes 2010; Wilson et al. 2009). International examples show
that stakeholder involvement is not bound to a particular political system, place or de-
velopment trajectory, but applicable in each and every resource management system
(Berkes 2010; Wilson et al. 2003). Certain components of co-management occur at
least in 130 fisheries worldwide (Gutiérrez et al. 2011).
Participatory methods echo the call of Basurto and Nenadovic (2012), who aim for a
fisheries management system that recognises fisheries as ‘complex adaptive systems’
and considers all disciplines involved as equal. Several methods are available for the
management of a given natural resource. One of the most prominent approaches, when
it comes to the reduction of conflicts through participatory methods, is adaptive co-
management (Armitage et al. 2007a; Berkes 2010). It encompasses four compatible ele-
ments: learning-by-doing, multiple knowledge systems, flexible management structures,
and advanced collaboration through power sharing (Folke et al. 2005; Plummer and
FitzGibbon 2007).
A strong argument for the growing popularity of adaptive co-management is the
demonstrated potential to mitigate the negative consequences of two characteristics
of conventional top-down resource management: non-linearity and unpredictability
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ural resource management (Berkes 2007; Folke et al. 2005).
The approach itself combines two elements, namely the participatory emphasis of
co-management and the importance of learning-by-doing within the adaptive man-
agement framework (Armitage et al. 2007b). In addition, ACM includes and enhances
tasks such as data gathering and both logistical and allocative decision making, and
generally leads to a more inclusive decision making process. Based on dialogue, inter-
action, and collaboration, this process is embedded in an interdisciplinary setting
(Armitage et al. 2007a). This interdisciplinary aspiration becomes apparent when as-
pects of knowledge formation are discussed.
Knowledge is therefore an essential component, yet often defined in different terms.
It is sometimes referred to either as indigenous knowledge (Berkes 2009), local know-
ledge (Armitage et al. 2008), traditional ecological knowledge (Berkes et al. 2000), fish-
ers’ ecological knowledge (Johnsen et al. 2014), or with reference to Iceland, as
practical knowledge (Pálsson 1998a). Apart from the variation of these terms, there is a
general consensus that the multiple epistemologies found within fisheries need to be in-
cluded and considered (Berkes 2009; Carlsson and Berkes 2005; Pálsson 1998a). Symes
and Phillipson (2009: 2) also highlight the importance of a more inclusive kind of
knowledge gathering, defining fishery communities as “reservoirs of knowledge, experi-
ence and understanding of local fisheries that cannot be replicated in any other form.”
Apart from the knowledge-generating pillar, ACM is based on three additional ele-
ments: delegation, devolution and/or decentralisation. Delegation can be understood
as the handing over of management responsibilities and authority across the institu-
tional or policy levels (Jentoft et al. 1998; Pomeroy 2000). Devolution also an essential
part of ACM (Plummer et al. 2013). It can be considered “as a kind of governance re-
form, a mechanism to bring citizens, local groups and organizations into the policy
and decision-making process” (Berkes 2010: 491). Devolution should not be inter-
preted as merely an increase of participants without effectively sharing power. This
will not result in an improved policy-making process, and can work as a placebo ra-
ther than a real remedy for the perceived flaws of the management system. In
addition, the number of participants is not so much of importance as is the quality of
methods applied and a clearly formulated objective (Reed 2008). Besides, the more
participants and stakeholder groups involved, the harder will efficient consensual de-
cision making become (Pomeroy et al. 2001; Symes 1997). Thus a balance between ef-
ficiency, accountability and legitimacy has to be found (Jentoft and McCay 1995;
Yandle 2007). Also devolution can result in a ‘participation paradox’: de Vivero et al.
(2008) point out that including more stakeholders eventually decreases the import-
ance of the single actor. Thus, “greater devolution does not necessarily result in
greater participation” (de Vivero et al. 2008: 320). Decentralisation is tied to the two
previous elements and can vary in form and intensity. A suitable definition that is
useful for the further discussion of the Icelandic case is provided by Pomeroy (2000:
135): “Decentralization refers to the systematic and rational dispersal of power, au-
thority and responsibility from the central government to lower or local level institu-
tions […] and then further down to regional and local governments, or even to
community associations.” However it is important to find the right balance in the
decentralization process. Too much decentralization can have counterproductive
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et al. 2005).
The misuse of power locally is just one example of the possible criticisms levelled
against co-management regimes. Others that are mentioned frequently concern the
costly and time-consuming processes that co-management can entail (Aranda and
Christensen 2009) and also that inclusiveness may not be as comprehensive as origin-
ally intended (Yandle 2003). The latter is a complex problem, but largely a semantic
one, concerning how to define precisely the term ‘stakeholder’ (Eythórsson 2003;
Mikalsen and Jentoft 2001; Soliman 2014b). This semantic problem will be discussed in
detail later. Regarding the aforementioned issue of complexity, it is essential to bear in
mind that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all solution’ for resource management, or a guaran-
teed blueprint emerging from the scientific laboratory. Hence, failure is always a pos-
sible outcome (Berkes 2009). It should be kept in mind that ACM is a long-term
scheme, and not a short term crisis remedy (Armitage et al. 2007b).
Stakeholder involvement in Icelandic fisheries
Much has been published on Icelandic fisheries management and ITQs. However, no
comprehensive analysis of stakeholder involvement over the entire period of ITQ man-
agement has been done, and in general the focus has not been on participatory con-
cepts. This is somewhat surprising, given that the development in the Icelandic
fisheries shifted from a broad consensus in the 1970s to the “most-dividing and
conflict-laden issue of Icelandic politics” in the 1990s (Eythórsson 2000: 484). For
McCay and Acheson (1987), the early stages of quota management were not only
shaped by consensus but even defined as co-management, fulfilling the attributes of
openness and flexibility alongside a trusted state. However, they relativized this conclu-
sion in a way which has since been verified, stating that the acceptance of the system
and the trust in state authorities can only be granted as long as the “continuation of
the ideology of equal, or equitable, access” is enabled (McCay and Acheson 1987: 33).
Whether these conditions have been met is questionable, since the subsequent financia-
lisation of fishing rights soon led to a substantial concentration of power (Benediktsson
and Karlsdóttir 2011).
For a better understanding of the development of the Icelandic system, different
stakeholder groups will be identified in this section and the influence or power of those
groups in policy making will be assessed through a review of the relevant literature. For
the sake of simplification, the choice of stakeholders follows the general criteria of
Mitchell et al. (1997). According to these authors, three main variables define a stake-
holder: power, legitimacy and urgency. Stakeholders are then subcategorized as defini-
tive, expectant or latent. Based on this, Mikalsen and Jentoft’s (2001) identification of
groups of relevant stakeholders in Norwegian fisheries management will now be modi-
fied and applied to the Icelandic case. While the latent stakeholders are excluded in the
following, the definitive and expectant groups will now be more closely defined and
their degree of power further discussed.
Definitive stakeholders are those that reach medium or high degrees in power, legit-
imacy and urgency. According to Mikalsen and Jentoft (2001), this applies for fishers,
fish processors, bureaucrats, enforcement agencies, scientists and fish workers. As a
category, ‘fishers’ is too vague considering the Icelandic circumstances. A division into
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who possess medium or high degrees in at least two of the three variables or have re-
ceived increased recognition. This applies to indigenous people, environmental groups
and local communities. Since ‘indigenous’ groups have a certain stake in Norwegian
fisheries, but are not present in Iceland, this group can be left aside. Also environmen-
tal groups have not really participated in the fisheries management discourse. Of the
expectant stakeholders therefore, only local communities will be discussed in the de-
scription that follows. We identify eight groups of stakeholders. It should be pointed
out that these groups are not mutually exclusive: a single person can belong to two or
more groups, e.g. ‘quota holders’ and ‘local community’ members.
Quota holders arguably constitute the most powerful group, since the quotas are at-
tached to vessels, and thus to their owners. This group is now represented by the asso-
ciation Fisheries Iceland (Samtök fyrirtækja í sjávarútvegi, or SFS), established in 2014
by the merger of the Federation of Icelandic Fishing Vessel Owners (Landssamband
íslenskra útvegsmanna, or LÍÚ) with the Federation of Icelandic Fish Processing Plants
(Samtök fiskvinnslustöðva, or SF) (http://www.sfs.is). The LÍÚ, de facto an association
of quota holders, was for a long time a highly influential interest group. Their influence
has been frequently and fiercely debated. Among scientists there is a broad consensus
that this stakeholder group has been very influential, even the leading one (Eythórsson
2000, 2003; Karlsdóttir 2008). The crucial support of LÍÚ during the policy making process
prior to the introduction of quota management underlines this theory (Gissurarson 2005;
Matthiasson 2003). Matthiasson (2003) considers Icelandic fisheries management as a
‘closed-shop policy’ with the governmental institutions remaining in a passive role, leaving
the field to LÍÚ. Their power reaches into political decision making. LÍÚ has at times
wielded its influence so as to thwart proposals for changes to the system (Thorhallsson and
Kattel 2013; Benediktsson and Karlsdóttir 2011).
Crew members belong to a group that is considerably less powerful, and which has
lost influence significantly since the introduction of the ITQ system (Eythórsson 1996).
The division between crew members and vessel owners defines one of the main conflict
lines among stakeholder groups that have “dominated the ITQ-debate in Iceland for
many years” (Eythórsson 2000: 489). Instead of a unified lobbying group such as LÍÚ
has been, crew members are represented by several different unions. Their representa-
tives do not have the same influence in the policy-making process as quota holders
have traditionally had. Crew members have been labelled as disenfranchised and
dependent (Carothers and Chambers 2012; Eythórsson 1996, 2000). This group has had
to accept changes initiated by more powerful institutions, since the only alternative in
most cases is to leave the sector. In other terms, the crew has a weakened bargaining
position under ITQs, but has to carry the burden of negative impacts within the system
(Carothers and Chambers 2012; Olson 2011).
Fish processors: This stakeholder group consists of the owners of fish processing com-
panies, whereas their employees are subcategorised as fish workers. Speaking of
Norway, Mikalsen and Jentoft (2001) think that plant owners are very powerful within
the fisheries production chain. The reason for this is the development of the sector,
characterised by centralisation and integration. This can also be said about Iceland.
With regard to power, integration is of importance since most of the processing is
owned by vertically integrated companies that include fishing, fish processing and
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tem, increased market power, and improved bargaining positions (Eythórsson 2000;
Knútsson et al. 2008; Pálsson 1998b).
The power imbalance, especially between the vertically integrated companies and fish
workers, can have momentous consequences. Recent examples include the decision of
a company to close three out of four processing plants in remote areas, concentrating
the operations at its home base in the southwest of Iceland. This is just one recent ex-
ample of the general trend from community-attached firms to a footloose industry
(Eythórsson 1996, 2000; Karlsdóttir 2008). In general this trend has “contributed to a
polarization in terms of affluence and survival favouring the new global businessman
above the locally oriented processor” (Karlsdóttir 2008: 9).
Fish workers are a stakeholder group consisting of employees in onshore processing
plants. They occupy the lowest rung in the fisheries’ power hierarchy, not only since
this group “has been least involved in decision making and policy design in the fisher-
ies” (Eythórsson 2000: 485), but also because of their often uncertain employment.
Their power is mainly dependent on the responsible union. But even strong unions
cannot prevent the permanent threat to those workplaces. This is not only due to cen-
tralisation processes in the sector, but also technological changes. After 1984 the fleet
of factory trawlers grew steadily (Eythórsson 2000), making parts of the land-based pro-
cessing redundant. This had noticeable consequences on the distribution of processing
plants. While 50 municipalities had such plants in 1992, only 35 did in 2005 (Karlsdóttir
2008). This number has decreased even more since. This case illustrates quite well that
those working in the processing plants are pawns in the hands of the powerful, facing the
choice of staying and looking for other work in their home region or to follow the com-
pany south-westwards.
The stakeholder group identified as bureaucrats mainly consists of employees of gov-
ernmental bodies, such as state authorities (differing from enforcement agencies) and
ministries. Classified in general as “principal authors of management laws and rules”,
this group was powerful before 1990 and during the initial stage of the quota imple-
mentation (Mikalsen and Jentoft 2001: 285).
Since ITQs are a form of privatization, it is to be expected that the influence of the
central government decreases over time. However, the fisheries minister still “has the
power to make ITQs worthless by the stroke of a pen without compensating the ITQ
holders” (Matthiasson 2003: 16). Also the state makes decisions about TACs for the
various species, which in itself is a source of considerable power.
Scientists: The assessment of power is difficult for this group and varies between the
scientific branches. On the one hand, the group of scientists appears in a consultative
capacity to the bureaucrats (Mikalsen and Jentoft 2001) and fisheries management has
to comply with best scientific advice (Holm et al. 2015). On the other hand, the scien-
tific community is not represented equally. Most important is the state run Marine Re-
search Institute (Hafrannsóknastofnun, or Hafró) that provides recommendations and
advice to the government bases on stock assessment and stock projections. The advis-
ory function includes also possible closures of fishing grounds and catch restrictions,
including the TAC. Hence, this scientific actor has, theoretically, a very high degree of
power with far reaching consequences. In practice, the recommendations from Hafró
have not always been followed (Woods et al. 2015).
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marine biologists (Benediktsson 2014; Eythórsson 2000; Karlsdóttir 2008; Matthiasson
1997; Pálsson 1998a). Social scientists other than economists are largely excluded from
this stakeholder group, which has been criticised.
Enforcement agencies: This group is represented mainly by the Directorate of Fisher-
ies (Fiskistofa). The role of this agency is surveillance, monitoring and the delivery of
data on landings that are considered when the TAC is determined. The TAC itself is al-
lotted by Fiskistofa. Furthermore, all commercial fishing operations are subject to a per-
mit from the agency. With the surveillance, monitoring and possible sanctioning,
Fiskistofa has mainly executive power.
Just as with the governmental bureaucrats, the influence of local communities is chal-
lenged in a privatised quota market. Historically, municipalities were quite influential
stakeholders, sometimes even the owners or shareholders, of vessels, plants and coop-
eratives (Matthiasson 1997). Over time, their influence has been decreasing, which is
partly self-imposed. Municipalities had and still have the chance to buy back quotas
that were or are about to be transferred out of the municipality. However, this option
was not often exercised during the first years of quota management, as it left the muni-
cipality with significant financial burdens (Eythórsson 1996; Matthiasson 1997). On the
whole, the fisheries sector has become ‘deterritorialized’ as most fishing villages have
lost influence on the decision-making about even those fish that are found in local wa-
ters (Benediktsson and Skaptadóttir 2002).
Figure 1 illustrates schematically the development of power in Icelandic fisheries pol-
icy making before and after 1990, based on the preceding identification of eight stake-
holder groups. The figure 0 marks no power at all, whereas 5 indicates the maximum
power possible. As stated at the beginning of this section, before the quota manage-
ment was initiated, the fisheries sector was characterised by a consensus-based policy
making process much more than later became the case. Therefore an equal rating of
moderate power for all stakeholder groups is assumed, with one exception: the bureau-














Before 1990 Since 1990
Fig. 1 Development of power in the Icelandic fisheries policy making. Interpretation of the power of
stakeholder groups in the Icelandic fisheries policy making before the introduction of ITQs in 1990 (blue
line) and thereafter (orange line). The figure 0 indicates the lowest degree of power, whereas 5 represents
the highest score in power
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ing another three groups in an inferior position while one group remained unchanged.
Analysing the trajectories of power (im)balances in the Icelandic fisheries manage-
ment, a paradoxical observation can be made: the more complex fisheries management
has got, the less stakeholder involvement has been granted from the policy makers. For-
mulating and executing the fisheries management policy soon became the endeavour of
a chosen few and of the political class (Eythórsson 2000, 2003; Matthiasson 2003;
Pálsson 1998a). This may be understandable from an efficiency-seeking perspective that
is based on the assumption that the fewer the stakeholders, the less complicated the
policy making is. This runs the risk, however, of overlooking some valuable knowledge
that is found within the various stakeholder groups.
The overall trend outlined in this section echoes in particular the diagnoses of the
rapid implementation of neoliberal politics in Iceland offered by Benediktsson (2014).
These politics that were enabled by sectoral corporatism that generally defines Ice-
landic governmental decision making (Thorhallsson and Kattel 2013). In addition, the
democratic system has been described as adverse, conflictual, and non-consensual, not
seeking compromise or consultation (Jónsson 2014; Thorhallsson 2013). This is rather
atypical in the Nordic context (Thorhallsson and Kattel 2013; Jónsson 2014). Sectoral
corporatism in the context of Icelandic democracy has been heavily influenced by the
fishing industry (Kristjánsson 2004; Thorhallsson 2013; Thorhallsson and Kattel 2013).
This has been enabled by informal and flexible decision making, with close personal
connections and strong ties between politics and economics that eventually weakened
the system of checks and balances (Vaiman et al. 2011). Thereby “substantial emphasis
on political favouritism rather than general policy-making” (Thorhallsson and Kattel
2013: 10) can be identified. We might recall the remark of Hersoug et al. (2000: 328)
on ITQs in general, that “the political reality is that a closing of a commons is not only
an economic transaction, it is even more a transfer of political power.”The survey
The empirical results for this paper stem from a survey that was conducted between
March and June 2014. The survey was part of the EU FP7 project EcoFishMan (http://
www.ecofishman.com), that analysed results-based management in European fisheries
with the view of contributing to reforms of the Common Fisheries Policy of the
European Commission (Nielsen et al. 2015). A central concern of the project was the
assessment of stakeholder views on fisheries policy and aspects of participation in the
policy making process. For this, a survey was designed jointly by the University of
Iceland and the research company Matís. The survey was intended to reach a balanced
group of participants. It did not, however, attempt to include all the groups identified
as stakeholders above (Fig. 1), but was aiming mainly for those stakeholders that are
directly involved in fisheries and whose daily livelihood is dependent on this resource.
The questionnaire was distributed in two phases. Field trips to selected municipalities
with fisheries and fisheries-related industries were the foundation of the first phase.
The communities themselves were located all around the country, including remote re-
gions, such as the Northeast. The idea behind these field trips was not only to distrib-
ute the survey, but also to gain a sense of the atmosphere, problems and concerns of
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survey was distributed.
Two difficulties were faced during these field trips. First, a language barrier was evi-
dent in the processing plants, where many workers were not of Icelandic origin. Even
though some were familiar with Icelandic, many technical terms were unfamiliar and
the necessary background information was not always provided. Second, certain local-
ities were relatively underrepresented, especially in the East. Following the fieldtrips, a
second phase was initiated with the generation of an unaltered online version of the
survey. This was distributed to many stakeholders in the fisheries, including companies
and institutions that had valid email addresses, with a request to participate and to fur-
ther distribute the link (snowball sampling) to colleagues.
The survey itself consisted of 40 questions subdivided into four categories: The as-
sessment of stakeholder participation; an evaluation of fisheries management; alterna-
tive management regimes; and aspects of trust and monitoring. In the following
chapters the focus will be on analysing those questions that are related to participatory
management approaches.Overview of participants
The total number of respondents in the survey was 392 (153 from the first phase, 239
from the second phase). When asked about occupation, a total of 144 respondents
identified themselves as ‘fishers’ and 80 as ‘processing workers’. In addition, the survey
included 81 people from various service industries that are directly fisheries-related,
such as net-mending or repairs, and another 79 participants that selected ‘other’ as oc-
cupation (e.g. office workers at fisheries firms). Eight respondents did not answer this
question. In addition to the broad occupational classes, the respondents were asked to
identify whether they were quota holders or not. Some 55 (14 %) turned out to be
quota holders. Thus five out of the eight categories of stakeholders identified above
(Fig. 1) are represented in the survey. Those not represented are scientists, bureaucrats
and enforcement agency staff – people who relate more indirectly to the fisheries sector
per se. The age and gender distribution is rather skewed. Almost 50 % of the partici-
pants were aged over 50, with the cohorts of 15–30 years old contributing only 10 % of
the total number. The questions were thus answered mostly by respondents with con-
siderable experience of the fisheries sector. An overwhelming majority of the respon-
dents were male, or 85 %.
The map (Fig. 2) shows the distribution of the respondents. Most answers were ob-
tained in the Capital Region, which is not surprising since approximately 60 % of the
population of Iceland reside in this region. The field trips to the South and Northeast
led to relatively high numbers of participants from these regions. Also the online ver-
sion of the survey invited the opportunity to increase the number of answers from the
remote Westfjords and the East. Reykjanes and the West have a fair number of respon-
dents, whereas the Northwest is underrepresented and thus not included in the analysis
of regional differences. However, this region is not much of a fisheries-dependent re-
gion anymore. Four per cent of the respondents did not indicate their residence.
In the discussion of the results, the respondents were divided into subgroups by three
variables. Given the concerns with geographically uneven impacts of the ITQ system,
Fig. 2 Regional distribution of participants (in %)
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background and the variable of quota holding were then also examined.General perceptions of ITQs and alternative fisheries management systems
The survey results indicate that, after some 25 years in place, opinions about the Ice-
landic ITQ system are still quite divergent among stakeholders. Moreover, possible al-
ternatives or modifications that were presented in the survey receive different levels
of support.
Figure 3 shows how specific fields of effectiveness related to the current manage-
ment regime were rated. The participants were asked to state in simple yes/no terms
whether they saw the ITQ system as being effective in achieving ecological, economic
and social/societal goals. Clear differences can be detected. Some 69 % see the current
management system as having been effective when it comes to the conservation of
fish stocks. Achievement of other goals is much more sceptically evaluated. A little
more than half the respondents think the ITQ system does not contribute to a stable
business environment. Almost three-fifths answer negatively the question about
whether a fair resource rent accrues to society at large, and more than two-thirds
think that the regime is ineffective concerning the fulfilment of social/community re-
sponsibility. A sharp difference in judgements of ecological vis-a-vis social effective-
ness can thus be detected.
Certain regional differences in the assessment of ITQ effectiveness are evident. Re-
spondents from the Westfjords especially show a high degree of scepticism about the
system. Just over one third thinks that resource rent accruing to society at large is fair
(interestingly enough, the Capital Region has even stronger negative opinion about this)
and only 13 % feel that goals of social responsibility are achieved by the management
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Social/community responsibility
Fair resource rent to society
Stable business environment
Conservation of fish stocks
Yes No
Fig. 3 Evaluation of the effectiveness of the ITQ system in different fields. Answers were given as either yes
(the system is effective in this field) or no (system does not contribute to effectiveness)
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of approval. Even the generally negative appraisals elsewhere of the system’s performance
regarding resource rent and social responsibility are not backed up in this region.
Analysing the results of these questions while differentiating between quota holders
and non-holders reveals two findings worth mentioning. While the general critique of
a lack of social responsibility is shared by the majority of quota holders (69 %: equal
to average), this group regards the resource rent to society criterion as achieved ac-
cording to 55 %.
Differing views are also present when it comes to opinions about other management
regimes and possible alternatives or amendments to the ITQ-system. Respondents were
asked to state their opinions about several management regimes on a five-item Likert-
scale (Fig. 4). Despite the fact that overall the ITQ system is rated critically with respect
to many of the goals which a fisheries management system is intended to fulfil, this sys-
tem receives the best rating, with a broad majority rating the recent regime either good
or very good. It is the only system that elicits a positive response from over 50 % of the
respondents. This applies to every region except the Westfjords and the Northeast.
These two regions are the only ones to choose a system other than the ITQ system
as the most preferable, namely coastal fisheries. Both regions have indeed lost a
great deal of quotas since the 1990s. The East and Reykjanes are the regions that
rate ITQs best. The former has fared rather well under the quota system in terms of
processing, while Reykjanes has some expanding fishing companies, most notably in
the town of Grindavík.
Community quotas (byggðakvótar), introduced in the fishing year 2002/03 in order to
increase the “social robustness” of suffering smaller coastal communities (Christensen
et al. 2009b), are considered the worst of the alternative systems. In all regions, negative
evaluations surpass the positive range, which does not happen with any other alternative
system. The West is most sceptical with 72 % in the negative range, followed by Reykjanes
(60 %). The Westfjords are the only region where the positive range (42 %) is about to
reach the negative evaluation (47 %).
Some hopes regarding new employment opportunities and the revitalization of









ITQ Coastal fishing Result-based
management
Effort quotas Community quotas
Very good Rather good Neither/nor Rather bad Very bad
Fig. 4 Evaluation of the ITQ system and alternative management regimes (in %)
Kokorsch et al. Maritime Studies  (2015) 14:15 Page 13 of 22scheme for small boats (Carothers and Chambers 2012). It is seen as the second best
option to ITQs. However, there are clear regional differences in the interpretation.
Whereas the Westfjords, Northeast, East, and Capital Region have a majority on the
positive side, Reykjanes and the South evaluate it rather negatively.
The alternative called here ‘results-based management’ was one of the core concepts of
the EcoFishMan project. In the context of the survey, it was defined and presented with
an example, since the concept has not been used much in discussions of Icelandic fisher-
ies. Results-based management was defined as shaped by cooperation and stakeholder in-
volvement; management plans that are mutually agreed upon by various stakeholder
groups; and new defined indicators to measure the success of those management plans.
These elements are in line with basic ideas of adaptive co-management. Therefore the re-
sults from this question are of special interest with regard to the theoretical issues dis-
cussed in the previous section, as well as for further discussion.
Overall this management idea received moderate ratings. Together with the ITQs,
this is the option which is least often evaluated negatively. Since the concept of results-
based management has hardly been articulated in Iceland, it is not surprising that 27 %
choose the neither/nor option. From a regional perspective, it is only the West and the
East that have a majority on the negative side. The largest shares of proponents are
found in the Capital region and Reykjanes.
It is evident that the main point of criticism of the ITQ system concerns the transfer-
ability of quotas, which is in line with the general debate around ITQs (Carothers and
Chambers 2012; Copes 1996; Pinkerton and Edwards 2009). When asked about possible
alternatives, non-transferable quotas scored highest (Fig. 5). However, it is somewhat
striking that even though there was no restriction on answers, none of the opportun-
ities listed got the approval of more than a third of the respondents. According to the
survey, it is mainly people in the Capital Region and the Westfjords who want to curtail
transferability, whereas the East shows the lowest support for the idea of non-
transferability (only 4 %).
Community quotas receive different approval among localities. While once again the
Capital Region and the Westfjords show the highest support, it is a very unpopular idea
in Reykjanes. When it comes to effort quotas, only the Westfjords show support signifi-
cantly above the average, whereas the South is very unlikely to support the idea. Catch
restrictions based on boat categories are most favoured alternative management option








Catch restrictions based on boat categories
Restricted fishing days/ Effort quotas
Other
Fig. 5 Possible amendments/alternatives to the ITQ system (in %). No restrictions on the number of
answers were presented
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As explained before, one part of the survey dealt with the assessment of stakeholder
participation, which is also a key element in the discussion of co-management. Before
the functions of co-management can be discussed it is essential to highlight that, ac-
cording to the survey, a majority of 79 % considers more involvement of fishers and
vessel owners in the implementation of fisheries management as a necessary step.
Against prior expectations, it was the workers from fish processing (70 %), the group
that was declared least powerful in section “Stakeholder involvement in Icelandic fish-
eries” above, who are least likely to demand more involvement. Stating this in basic
yes/no terms, the subsequent questions offered more differentiated response options:
Three questions dealt with the consideration of certain interests of stakeholders and
the knowledge utilisation, whereas another open question aimed for a fuller investiga-
tion of the particular fields in which enhanced stakeholder involvement was thought to
be necessary.
Three questions with a Likert-scale answer range aimed for an assessment of stake-
holder participation (Fig. 6). The general impression is that a lack of stakeholder repre-
sentation is sensed by the participants. Some 52 % feel that the interests of
stakeholders in fisheries are taken rather little or very little into account in the policy
making. The question whether the views of fishers and vessel owners are considered in
practical arrangements, such as gear restrictions, certain closures or boat sizes was not
only answered more negative, it was also the question that got the least answers in the
positive range. Most negative were the views on the (non-)utilisation of the fishers and
vessel-owners knowledge in management practices.
All three questions received significantly different answers by respondents consider-
ing occupational backgrounds and the question of quota-holding. In all aspects of
stakeholder participation, it is the fishers who are most negative about the current
state, peaking in the consideration of practical arrangements (72 %). Enhanced partici-
pation in the policy making is least demanded by employees from the service industries
(35 %). This is the only group that shows a slightly higher rate of agreement than dis-
agreement. When it comes to the utilisation of knowledge, the workers from processing
plants are less negative (47 %) than the other occupations.
Strong differences can also be detected between quota-holders and non-quota








Policy making Practical arrangements Knowledge utilisation
Very much Rather much Neither/nor Rather little Very little
Fig. 6 Assessment of stakeholder participation (in %). The questions were stated thus: a) Are interests of
stakeholders in the fisheries taken into account in policy making? b) Are the views of fishers and vessel
owners considered in practical arrangements? c) Is the knowledge of fishers and vessel owners utilised in
management practice?
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arrangements (56 %). The differences between these groups are striking and show a gap
up to 19 percentage points.
The results of the open question were interpreted and grouped with an analytic tool
designed by Pinkerton (Pinkerton 1989), which was slightly modified. Pinkerton identi-
fies seven fields in which enhanced involvement finds application (Fig. 7).
The most desired field of increased stakeholder involvement is broad policy- and de-
cision making. This can be linked to a remark by Berkes (2010) about devolution and
basic democratic principles. He argues that those who are affected in their well-being
should have a say in the decision-making process. Even though more inclusive decision
making scores highest, it is seen quite differently by the various groups of respondents.
Only some 27 % of employees from the service industries emphasise this, with 52 % of
those stakeholders defined as ‘other’ being most positive about it. The numbers for the
fishers and processing workers are 44 % and 29 % respectively. The average is 39 %.
That data gathering is considered as a field that needs enhanced stakeholder involve-
ment is not surprising, since a certain mistrust towards the responsible institutions was
sensed during the interviews that were conducted. Also, strong statements in response0 10 20 30 40
Broad policy decision making
Data gathering and analysis
Harvest allocation decisions
Logistical harvesting decisions
Enforcement of regulations or practices
Enhancement and long-term planning
Protection of resources
Other
Fig. 7 Fields for enhanced stakeholder involvement (in %)
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It is mainly fishers (33 %) and the employees from the service sector (38 %) who de-
mand a say in this regard.
Harvest allocation decisions focus on quantitative regulations, for example the annual
TAC. Logistical harvesting decisions differ as they focus on who can fish, when to fish
and where to fish. Despite the discussion around initial allocations and the unequal dis-
tributions of quotas, concluding from the answers given here, the question who can fish
is not as prominent as quantitative concerns. With regard to the before mentioned mis-
trust in official figures that are crucial for the TAC, this result is a logical consequence.
An interesting result is the very low demand for involvement in the protection of re-
sources. On the one hand, it can be interpreted as just another positive evaluation of
the overall effectiveness regarding ecological concerns. On the other hand it is surpris-
ing that, considering the mistrust in official data and the demand for enhanced partici-
pation in quantitative regulations, this field scores the lowest. This leads to the
assumption that the stakeholders want to get involved in the delivery of data, but not
in its interpretation.Discussion
Results regarding ITQs
As stated in the previous section, the critique of the ITQ system itself is not homoge-
neous. Rather the system is criticised on many fronts and from different angles. In this
survey we have identified four categories of critique (Fig. 3), but excluding one tren-
chantly criticised aspect: The initial quota allocation process. This was due to the fact
that the categories were not asking about particular shortcomings but, in this case, so-
cial/societal concerns in general.
Throughout the survey it became apparent that ecological concerns were the least
controversial. These results reflect the assumptions of ITQ proponents regarding the
ecological success of such a system (Árnason 2005). Conversely, this aspect is the only
one related to effectiveness that is answered positively among the majority of respon-
dents. The feeling that the current management regime does not contribute effectively
to the stability of the business environment according to the majority, is astonishing in
a country that is not only dependent on fisheries but where the fisheries seem to be in
a reasonably healthy state. This is perhaps just another sign of the profound uncertainty
that prevails in the sector, but might also be the result of the recent financial crisis (see
discussion below; see also (Durrenberger and Pálsson 2014). For the sake of fairness it
is important to underline that the stability of fisheries businesses depends on at least
two major variables (or complicating factors) in addition to the political setting: sus-
tainable and stable fish stocks, and a stable economy. Economic stability is partly a do-
mestic issue, but also dependent on international conditions. While the domestic issue
is characterised by debates about instruments such as resource fees, international
concerns are shaped by severe currency fluctuations that affect this important ex-
port sector.
It is not surprising that the question of whether fair resource rent accrues to society
at large is a central point of criticism (Christensen et al. 2009b; Gissurarson 2005;
Hannesson 2003). Árnason (2005: 255) postulates that “estimates of the actual
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indicate that very substantial economic benefits are already being generated by this
management system.” Whether or not this statement is correct, one question should
be raised at this point: Exactly to whom do those benefits accrue, since the majority
of stakeholders feel that the distribution of benefits is lacking in fairness? The palp-
able tension surrounding this discussion is a central theme among scientists (Copes
1996; Hannesson 2003; Holm et al. 2015; Matthiasson and Agnarsson 2009; Soliman
2014b). A conflict-reducing economic measure that has been discussed alongside
quotas was the introduction of resource fees. However, there is no evidence that the
introduction of a catch fee in 2002, which was “an effort aimed at reducing the ten-
sion caused by free allotment of quotas” (Matthiasson and Agnarsson 2009: 303), has
lowered the existing discontent.
That a stable majority of respondents senses a lack of social responsibility and fair re-
source rent to the society at large substantiates the observations of several scientists.
For Pálsson (1998b: 280) this is the consequence of the prerogative of economic effi-
ciency that dominates the discourse: “social issues are pushed to the periphery, per-
ceived as mere distractions from the objective and essentially technical undertaking of
promoting efficient production.” Overall the quota system has thus “instituted a new
level of social inequality” (Pálsson 1998b: 285). This statement from the late 1990s is
still valid. Benediktsson and Karlsdóttir (2011) state that the question of social equity
has been sidestepped entirely. Holm et al. (2015) even argue that the ‘social contract’
has been violated, due to a lack of emphasis on the coastal livelihood. For Matthiasson
and Agnarsson (2009), the social shortcomings within the current regime can be con-
nected to discussions about the initial allocation that enabled the generation of windfall
profits for a few quota-holders, while former fisheries communities saw quotas trans-
ferred away. Even though most critiques addressed moral and ethical issues regarding
the allocation process, there were critical, albeit unheard, voices that saw Iceland falling
into a generational conflict such as the transitional gains trap (Copes 1996; Olson 2011;
Tullock 1975). Receiving quotas, and thus a marketable asset, for free, gives the first
generation of quota holders an economic advantage that the following generations have
to compensate.
Building on this critique, Eythórsson (2000: 489) goes even further when he speaks
of marginalised communities that “are left without many options for coping with the
situation [the quota loss]”. This is of special concern since a number of these commu-
nities, referred to as ‘single-enterprise communities’ (Eythórsson 2000) or ‘one-com-
pany towns’ (Karlsdóttir 2008), were heavily dependent on fisheries and related
industries. Hence it is not surprising that respondents from those communities and
regions which have shown negative tendencies since the 1990s in terms of overall so-
cioeconomic development and fisheries in particular, evaluated the current regime
worst with regard to effectiveness.
Discussions about a stable business environment, social responsibility or a fair re-
source rent cannot be concluded without considering the financial crisis that hit
Iceland in 2008. The extent to which this crisis can be linked to the introduction of
ITQs has already been discussed by several authors (Maguire 2014; Benediktsson 2014;
Benediktsson and Karlsdóttir 2011). Quotas were used extensively as collateral and
mortgageable for speculative investment strategies. How far the crisis has influenced
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landic currency that accompanied the crisis led to a great increase in the value of exported
marine products (Maguire 2014; Statistic Iceland 2014). Most fisheries-dependent regions
have proven more resistant to the shocks that the crisis entailed, but then it should be
kept in mind that they never benefitted from the economic boom that preceded it to the
same extent as the capital region (Benediktsson and Karlsdóttir 2011).Aspects of participation
As discussed in section “Adaptive co-management and fisheries”, knowledge acquisition
is a central theme in fisheries (co)management. As the subsequent discussion has
shown, however, there are is no clear agenda within the Icelandic management system
on how to integrate different forms of knowledge. This current sentiment recalls the
view of Pálsson (1998a: 50) who contended that “the inclusion of fishermen’s know-
ledge was ‘gradually subdued’ since ITQs got introduced.” Or, with reference to
Carlsson and Berkes (2005), there is no ‘epistemic community’ based on the close co-
operation of fishermen, scientists and the administration. Hence, the aspect of repre-
sentation and collaboration needs to be taken up for discussion again. In general not
much seems to have changed since the assertion by Eythórsson (2000: 490), that “the
practice of working out the fisheries management policy by broad debates and consen-
sus in the Fisheries Assembly and by preparing new legislation by task forces with
broad representation from different stakeholder groups is now abandoned”.
That the fishers are demanding more inclusiveness is not surprising. Almost two de-
cades ago, Pálsson (1998a) considered that more inclusiveness could help to overcome
the conflict-laden discourse between scientists and fishermen. This discourse is long-
lasting and still ongoing, despite the fact that Iceland has experimented with an instru-
ment to join the partly opposing types of knowledge. In the year 1985 the togararall
(trawling rally) was introduced to the Icelandic fisheries. Some skippers therefore col-
lected data in collaboration with biologists on previously defined paths. This was a
“diplomatic endeavour” with the aspiration to lower the gap between scientific and
practical knowledge while collecting ecological data collaboratively at sea (Pálsson
1998a). However, judging from the feelings of fishermen uttered in the open questions
and the atmosphere during informal interviews during the fieldtrips, this endeavour
has failed to solve knowledge-based conflicts, 30 years after its implementation. This
conclusion is supported by the survey.
From an adaptive co-management perspective, the results from the question on dif-
ferent fields of participation can be discussed from various angles. A general consensus
about the need for a broader decision making process can be detected; however, this
needs to be defined more precisely. That stakeholders are not aiming for the enhance-
ment and long-term planning (only 10 % are in this category) is in this regard surpris-
ing. Being one of the unique characteristics that differentiate ACM strategies from
conventional policy making processes, a clear call for more inclusiveness in the long-
term planning cannot be detected. On the other hand, if this particular field of partici-
pation includes the question “where to concentrate management effort and what future
is desired” (Pinkerton 1989: 6), it is easier to understand this low ranking: previous dis-
cussions in this section have shown that alternative systems or amendments to the ITQ
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unanimously agreed upon. Furthermore, the fields of involvement vary between the
stakeholder groups, and so this particular call for specific enhancement ranks much
lower than the more general one for broad decision making.Conclusion
Are the Icelandic fisheries at a crossroads? Seen as a whole, the country’s fisheries sec-
tor is flourishing economically. However, continuing down the same path runs the risk
of negative socioeconomic challenges – already visible in a number of former fishing
communities around the country – becoming irresolvable. A return to an open-access
regime can be regarded as an untenable. It would not result in a sustainable fishery.
Therefore the question arises whether an intermediate way might be found. Increased
participation of certain stakeholder groups could play a part in developing the fisheries
management system towards a more holistic approach.
The instruments of adaptive co-management could offer possibilities for a more in-
clusive policy. The stakeholders’ will to introduce certain features of this approach is
evident, as shown by the relevant survey questions discussed above. However, the will
and commitment of the affected stakeholder groups is only one side of the story. Ne-
cessary policy changes have to come from governmental institutions as well. The polit-
ical will for introducing more participatory processes is not present at this stage. One
reason for that is the asymmetric power distribution among stakeholder groups. Fur-
thermore, the socio-spatial disparities mentioned above tend to be overshadowed by
the macro-economic benefits that have come with consolidation of quotas and econ-
omies of scale in the fisheries. The transferability of quotas is vehemently criticised and
discussed, however. It is seen as not only dangerous for the coastal communities, but
also contrary to prevailing ideas of fairness and justice. Despite the power imbalances
and the numerous critiques that can be found within the the survey, the ITQ system as
such is not to be overturned but to be improved.
In addition to the policy and decision making level, ACM does have a potential to
improve processes of knowledge generation and utilisation in Icelandic fisheries. State-
ments about a cleavage between scientific knowledge and the practical knowledge of
fishers were abundant in the survey. ACM strategies can help to join these two (not ne-
cessarily opposing) strands of knowledge. Trust in the institutions, especially Hafró and
its scientific assessment of fish stocks, is now lacking among the fishers and other
stakeholders. The need for a change of methodologies towards more collaborative data
gathering is clear.
Fisheries management is a complex task, but it is not impossible. ITQs are one man-
agement option, but one that is flawed in some fundamental respects. Iceland needs to
learn from experiences elsewhere in order to adapt successfully to demands for a more
inclusive and just arrangement. Inclusiveness, however, cannot only be about quantita-
tive improvements, but has to be in compliance with an effective devolution of power.
The devolution process has to consider aspects of efficiency, legitimacy and account-
ability. As mentioned at the beginning of this article, the Icelandic fisheries seem to be
dealing with something of a Gordian knot – one tied together by its stakeholders, but
one that can (only) be untangled through their effective collaboration.
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